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Abstract: 
This paper uses contextual explanations of regional governance to explore how the limitations to 
voluntary regionalism can lead to the more centralized, more regulated method of using regional 
special districts.  An ICA perspective is used to discuss the range of choices in institutional 
arrangements available to jurisdictions.  Motivations that jurisdictions may have to use more 
versus less autonomous methods of ICA are outlined to frame how regional districts fall within 
this spectrum.  A rational choice perspective is also employed to identify the collective and 
selective benefits that motivate local actors to cooperate, as well as identify the potential 
transaction cost barriers to doing so.  The analysis of this piece focuses on three specific types of 
special districts (fire, hospital and library districts) that are compared within the context of 
motivations to regional collective action.  The assumptions from this analysis suggest that 
regional districts will act as a substitute for voluntary cooperation when the individual and 
collective benefits are threatened by high transaction costs.  These assumptions are worked into 
sets of contextual propositions about how regional districts can present themselves as 
mechanisms of addressing collective action problems where substantial transaction cost barriers 
to voluntary cooperative efforts exist.             
 
 
 
A paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association annual meeting, New Orleans, 
Louisiana January 8-10, 2009. 
1 
 
Choices in Regional Governance Structures: Special Districts as Collaboration 
Mechanisms 
 
Debates about whether local governments should cooperate using centralized versus 
decentralized governance structures have continued on the public administration forefront for 
several decades.  The first line of these debates, entails the traditional connotation of regional 
governance, and sees full government consolidation as being the focal point of regionalism and 
efficiency while equity and accountability are attainable only through centralization.  This 
perspective builds upon the progressive reform tradition of the early 20th century, which relied on 
centralizing authority to remove the control of local governments from the political machines 
that dominated municipal politics.  However, this centralized view-point of regionalism gained 
little acceptance, as nearly eighty-percent of city-county consolidation proposals in the United 
States have been rejected by voters (Olberding, 2002).   
The second line of debates places an emphasis on centralized regional governments to 
enhance efficiencies and maximize economies of scale.  This viewpoint of regionalism gained 
popularity during the 1960’s, and placed a focus on the creation of formalized regional planning 
agencies to administer regional governance.  This method was widespread and was backed by 
federal funding efforts to motivate local governments to facilitate coordination in this fashion 
(Olberding, 2002). Nevertheless, the popularity of this system dwindled as the federal 
government cut many regionally oriented programs during the 1980’s (Olberding, 2002).  A 
more recent focus of regional cooperation is viewed as encompassing a system of horizontally 
and vertically linked organizations to centralize regional efforts through coordinated interlocal 
collaboration (Lowery, 2000; Feiock, 2004; 2007).  Here, organizations voluntarily work 
together under institutional arrangements to coordinate efforts to meet regional needs.  This 
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perspective, which has been referred to as institutional collective action (ICA), entails the 
facilitation of regionalism through such efforts as voluntary intergovernmental contracts, 
agreements and exchanges to achieve collective benefits (Feiock, 2007).       
 Collective action of this sort borrows from notions of individual collective action, which see 
individuals acting collectively to achieve aims that enhance their individual interests (Olson, 
1965).  ICA applies these concepts to regional governance and sees multiple jurisdictions 
working together to enhance their own interests, while still contributing to the broader collective 
need. Such efforts allow local governments to augment the provision of their services and 
address citizens’ demands where doing so on an individual basis may be more difficult.  
However, “where transaction cost barriers to institutional collective action are substantial, 
voluntary regional governance may not be possible and governmental approaches such as 
consolidation and regional districts may be more efficacious” (Feiock, 2007: 48).   
 Contextual assumptions about voluntary ICA entail that such efforts can bring forth a 
collective benefit to regional communities, yet limitations based upon general explanations of 
group theory and rational choice exist (Feiock, 2007).  As ICA borrows from the concept of 
basic group theory (Olsen, 1965), it is hypothesized that the basic conditions of group action 
must exist for voluntary regionalism to take place.  The number of participants willing to form 
groups must be small, a certain level of homogeneity among participants must exist, and 
similarities in goals or policy objectives must be established (Post, 2004).  A rational choice 
perspective entails that the individual and collective benefits of interlocal cooperation must 
outweigh the costs (Feiock, 2007; Coase, 1988).  To facilitate voluntary arrangements, actors 
must meet the condition of overcoming problems of coordination, division, and defection 
(Maser, 1998).  The transaction costs of monitoring and enforcement must be minimized in order 
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for successful bargaining agreements to be achieved.  When these conditions are minimal or non-
existent, barriers to voluntary institutional collective action are said to exist.  In such cases, local 
governments must look to other more regulated means of collective action when regional 
cooperation is imperative. 
 This paper uses contextual explanations of regional governance to explore how the 
limitations to voluntary regionalism can lead to the more centralized, more regulated method of 
using regional special districts.  An ICA perspective is first used to discuss the range of choices 
in institutional arrangements available to jurisdictions.  I identify the motivations that 
jurisdictions may have to use more versus less autonomous methods of ICA and frame how 
regional districts fall within this spectrum.  I next use a rational choice perspective to identify the 
collective and selective benefits that motivate local actors to cooperate, as well as identify the 
potential transaction cost barriers to doing so.  The analysis of this piece focuses on three 
specific types of special districts (fire, hospital and library districts) that are compared within the 
context of motivations to regional collective action.  The assumptions from this analysis suggest 
that regional districts will act as a substitute for voluntary cooperation when the individual and 
collective benefits are threatened by high transaction costs.  These assumptions are worked into 
sets of contextual propositions about how regional districts can present themselves as 
mechanisms of addressing collective action problems where substantial transaction cost barriers 
to voluntary cooperative efforts exist.  These propositions are contextual in the sense that they 
are framed within the context of the collective and selective benefits of cooperation.  These 
propositions are used within the final section of this essay to explain how this framework 
development can be applied empirically to future research endeavors.                    
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Choices in Institutional Arrangements of Cooperation 
The institutional mechanisms for resolving collective action problems range from simply 
specifying the “property rights” of authorities and letting them negotiate through informal 
arrangements to the full consolidation of existing units into a regional general purpose 
government (Feiock, 2007; Stein, 1990).   In between these extremes are several alternatives 
including voluntarily established regional districts for specific functions.   As illustrated in figure 
1, Scholz and Feiock (2007) array eight regional governance institutions according to the 
autonomy retained by the individual local government actors involved.  High levels of autonomy 
retention entail more voluntary methods of regional cooperation.  Low levels of autonomy 
retention entail more regulated methods. 
At the high autonomy end of the spectrum informal policy networks are used to harness 
regional collaborative efforts.  At the other end lay fully consolidated general purpose 
governments.  Policy networks entail informal connections among agencies that are designed to 
reduce obstructions to coordinated policy solutions (Scholz, Feiock, and Ahn, 2006).  The 
success of these networks greatly depends on the interconnectedness and density of the 
participating organizations.  Larger networks with greater density will usually have greater 
chances for collaboration (Schneider et al., 2003; Scholz, Feiock, and Ahn, 2006).  However, the 
informal voluntary nature of these networks makes them the most limited in their abilities to 
resolve regional problems (Feiock, 2008).  In instances where the costs of negative externalities 
are high institutions will require more formal cooperative arrangements to assure compliance.  
High transaction costs make policy networks a less attractive method of cooperation due to their 
weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement.    
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Government consolidation, on the other hand requires the formal merging of jurisdictions, 
which requires one or both to give up government autonomy.  Although full consolidation efforts 
have historically encountered voter resistance, partial consolidation efforts have been more 
prevalent.  Specific functions are merged among governmental units with the intent of both 
jurisdictions maintaining their autonomous governing powers while sharing the costs and 
benefits of service provision.  The success of these endeavors, however depend on the levels of 
political and fiscal compromises that jurisdictions may have to make to formulate agreements.  
The merging of police functions, for instance may be difficult to achieve as neither jurisdiction 
may be willing to sacrifice a police chief or impose additional tax burdens on citizens.  The 
political and financial costliness of consolidation may deem it as being a less feasible choice in 
resolving regional dilemmas (Feiock, 2008).   
 
  Figure 1 about here 
 
As opposed to policy networks or consolidation endeavors, voluntary regional districts 
allow jurisdictions to resolve collective problems through regulated means without requiring 
jurisdictions to bare undue fiscal costs.  Special districts maintain autonomous taxing and 
borrowing powers that allow them to incur costs that are separate from general government 
budgets.  The revenue generation powers of districts allow them to act as servicing mechanisms 
while having the ability to act as self supporting entities.  Taxing districts specifically, have a 
significant advantage as they can relieve jurisdictions of the pressures of imposing additional 
taxes on citizens (McManus, 1981).  Their abilities to undertake public debt with less public 
scrutiny also gives them the advantage when it comes to making substantial investments in large 
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capital infrastructure (Foster, 1997; McCabe, 2000).  Services with a capital intensive nature can 
create scale economies for special districts that may otherwise require investments that are too 
costly for general governments (Mullin, 2009).  The self revenue generation powers of special 
districts give them the ability to undertake more investment risks that require substantially higher 
start-up costs in order to obtain the long-term benefits of economies of scale.       
 Regional districts have the flexibility to resolve collective action problems across 
jurisdictional boundaries (Mullin, 2009; Carr, 2005; Gerber and Gibson, 2005).  The dilemmas 
inherent within the fixed boundaries of general purpose governments entail complexities in 
addressing spillover problems.  The inflexibilities of local government boundaries are often 
realized through state regulations and the political/cost complications of annexation.  Where 
states impose heavy city boundary changing constraints, general governments will have little 
opportunity to adjust their borders to reflect changing service demands.   The procedural 
intricacies of annexation often involve voter notification and approval, as well as the availability 
and development of annexable land.  Legal caution must be taken into consideration, as officials 
must be careful such that annexation procedures do not create enclaves.  Special districts can 
often address these dilemmas by offering efficiencies in the enhancement of economies of scale 
through expanding or crosscutting existing boundaries.  The difficulties of annexation can make 
districts an attractive substitute in regional endeavors.  The flexibility of special districts to create 
territorial change can promote creative intergovernmental problem solving as the creation of 
overlap or a common boundary can prompt jurisdictions to become more like service partners 
within a cooperative agreement (Mullin, 2009). 
    
The Costs and Benefits of Cooperation 
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Discussions about voluntary interlocal cooperation can be summed up within the 
cost/benefit explanations of transactions.  The rationale behind collective action can be 
approached from a perspective that sees the collective and individual benefits of cooperation as 
major motivating factors (Feiock, 2007 Ostrom, 1990; Olsen, 1965).  Collective benefits are 
attained when group efficiencies and economies of scale are gained through the resolution of 
externality problems (Feiock, 2007).   The motivation to cooperate in this instance may be driven 
by the need to act collectively to bring forth joint efforts that alleviate negative externalities in 
order to realize positive benefits for the regional community as a whole.  The individual or 
selective benefits are generated when the benefits of group action directly advance the individual 
interests of public officials or their immediate community (Feiock, 2007).  Such motivations may 
stem from the need of a public official to look for an innovative method of outsourcing services 
that the community may not be able to provide on its own.  Barriers to these collective and 
selective benefits however are realized when voluntary interlocal collaboration is faced with 
risks associated with problems of coordination, division and defection.  The costliness of 
mitigating risks through the efforts of agreement monitoring and enforcement can bring forth 
difficulties in voluntary cooperation efforts, and lead to the implementation of mechanisms with 
institutional safeguards that promote stability and efficiency (Maser, 1998).       
Collective Benefits of Cooperation 
The notion behind assumptions of collective benefits entail that the benefits of interlocal 
cooperation are such that advance the group as a whole.  Interlocal cooperation can generally 
bring forth specialized governance structures to promote collective gains among multiple 
jurisdictions in efforts to overcome service allocation problems.  Such problems can come when 
single institutions have difficulties internalizing spillovers.  Spillovers can be costly when the 
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services intended for one population unintentionally affect another, especially when the 
unintended beneficiaries are already receiving such services from another local institution.  This 
overlap represents wastefulness in resources, which can be costly on local budgets.   Additional 
service allocation problems will materialize when the unintended beneficiaries are simply free-
riding from services not provided otherwise, and therefore have no incentive to contribute to 
production (Ostrom, 1999).  This issue can be problematic, especially on the behalf of the 
institutions providing the services.  When service providers are forced to recoup investments 
through even exchanges, free-ridership problems can lead to a disincentive to adequately provide 
services (Ostrom, 1999).  Such problems can lead to an underinvestment in the development of 
infrastructure.  Group efforts to alleviate such service allocation problems can give rise to the 
collective benefits of interlocal cooperation.     
Collective benefits are also likely to be realized when large scale service problems stand to 
bring forth large aggregate gains from cooperation (Feiock, 2007).  The individual investments 
made to address service inefficiencies must be outweighed by respective group gains in order 
for interlocal cooperation to exist.    
 “Interlocal cooperation can be the product of efficiency-enhancing efforts of local 
officials seeking economies of scale in production, especially in the case of capital-
intensive goods (Post, 2002).  A Polycentric system of governments enhances allocative 
efficiency if it produces a match between community preferences for quantities and 
qualities of a service and actual service choices and resource allocations; but it can also 
result in diseconomies of scale in service production and interjurisdictional externalities.  
Economies of scale result when average cost declines as output increases.  Fragmented 
governments are constrained by their size if there are not enough citizen consumers in a 
jurisdiction to produce a service at minimum cost.  For this reason, economies of scale 
are often cited as the impetus for interlocal agreements” (Feiock, 2007: 49). 
.    
 The transaction costs encompassed within the nature of services dictate the levels of scale 
economies that local governments can achieve. Services with higher fixed costs can bring forth 
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higher cooperative efficiency gains as large short-term investments may stand to bring forth 
long-term benefits.  High fixed costs may also entail costly large scale production endeavors 
with high individual unit costs.  The mutual gains of collective action can be realized through the 
reduction of costs to individual investors.     
Individual/Selective Benefits of Cooperation 
 The individual incentives that are afforded to actors have implications for their willingness 
to act collectively (Feiock, 2007; Olsen, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).  The understanding behind the 
individual and selective motivations of interlocal cooperation can come two-fold.  From one 
standpoint, the specific institutional benefits that general governments are due to gain from 
cooperation must be higher than the respective costs.  From another standpoint, the benefits of 
cooperation must bring specific gains to the individual actors within the institutional decision 
making process.  This perspective sees the motivations of local government officials as playing 
an important role in local government decisions to cooperate.   
 Advocates of the traditional view of regionalism cite competition within a decentralized 
system as having negative impacts on regional governance, thus making the existence of 
cooperation difficult.  However, “proponents of decentralization have a powerful body of 
economic theory backed by formal models and empirical evidence to explain competition in 
public good provision and its generally positive implications for efficiency” (Feiock, 2004:12).  
In this light, governmental organizations can be viewed as firms that often must provide desired 
services as demanded by consumers.  Yet, some services are more costly to provide than others, 
bringing forth limitations in production.  Limitations of this nature motivate governments to look 
beyond their own boundaries to expand their capacity for service production.  Service capacity 
problems can bring forth institutional specific incentives that will motivate local governments to 
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enter into cooperative agreements.  General governments often seek to improve their positions by 
maintaining or improving their capacity to provide services (Peterson, 1981).  According to the 
“Tiebout Model,” the lack of the ability of institutions to meet service demands, especially for 
essential services can have negative impacts on the local tax base (Bickers et al., 2006). Where 
service demands are high, and service capacity problems exists, institutions may seek 
cooperative arrangements with other government institutions to overcome this dilemma.  This is 
especially true in cases where local governments must look outward for the provision of non-
market services or services that require highly asset specific resources for production (Feiock, 
2007; Mullin, 2009; Brown and Potoski, 2002).         
  To complement the competition argument, Feiock (2007) cites the personal incentives of 
local leaders as playing a major role in decisions to enter into cooperative agreements.  Selective 
incentives of this sort can come from both the political and the professional incentives of 
managers to benefit from institutional transactions.  Within the political realm managers are the 
focus of political activity and as a result are driven to minimize political hassles and turmoil 
(Miller, 2000).  The ability of an elected official to respond to service demands will dictate her 
ability to maintain her political position.  External stakeholders can make life difficult for 
officials through strikes, slowdowns, sabotages (Miller, 2000) or by simply reducing political 
support.  The desire to minimize these difficulties forces officials to find creative ways to 
contend service delivery problems. Here, the selective benefits of collaboration can be viewed as 
driving the desire of elected officials to provide desired services to electoral constituents and 
minimize political difficulties. 
 The professional incentives of local leaders stems from their desires to improve their 
careers by conducting successful institutional transactions (Miller, 2000).  Finding innovative 
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ways to address service inefficiencies and stimulate economic growth can raise the professional 
stock of the public managers who orchestrate these events.  Instances such as this give public 
officials the opportunity to be the residual claimants of institutional gains by putting them in the 
position to find better paying positions in larger and wealthier communities (Feiock, 2007).  
Collaborative service arrangements can produce personal benefits for local officials through the 
creation of bargaining positions that represent the better interests of constituents (Feiock, 2007).  
Managers who successfully negotiate the distribution of cooperative gains can bring forth a 
social benefit that represents their competence as public leaders.  However, agency problems 
may complicate this matter in that “the preferences of public officials negotiating interlocal 
agreements may depart from the preferences of citizens they represent” (Feiock, 2007:54).  The 
shorter time horizons of elected officials may conflict with long-term community needs 
(Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001).  Conversely, the willingness to credibly commit to long-term 
investments may conflict with constituency fears during times of budgetary uncertainties.  
Transaction Cost Barriers to Voluntary Cooperation 
Why would local governments need to move towards more regulated, less autonomous 
methods of the regional governance?  The general assumption advanced within this paper entails 
that when transaction cost barriers to voluntary cooperation exist, governments will rely on 
regional centralized institutions such as special districts to manage regional problems.  When the 
collective and selective benefits to regional cooperation are blocked or at least outweighed by 
transaction costs, actors within cooperative arrangements will require institutional safeguards to 
protect their interests.  The collective benefits of cooperation are thought to be jeopardized when 
the basic assumptions of group dynamics are violated, and division and defection problems are 
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existent.  The selective benefits are threatened when cooperative arrangements are presented 
with problems of coordination.             
From a collective standpoint, conditions of ICA are similar to those for individual 
cooperation, in that group size, the homogeneity of community characteristics and policy 
objectives, and the existence of coercive incentives will dictate the successfulness of collective 
efforts (Post, 2004).  To elaborate, smaller groups in voluntary cooperative efforts will give 
acting governments more benefits to forge agreements.  Whereas larger groups seeking 
collective action efforts will yield higher transaction costs due to the decreasing benefits of 
cooperation (Post, 2004).  An increase in the number of local governments within a region 
generates competition among those governments for limited resources such as capital and labor, 
which at times may act as a hindrance to voluntary cooperation (Post, 2004; Peterson, 1981; 
Tiebout, 1956).  Complexities of this nature come forth as competition for valuable resources 
lead to costly defection problems.  Because actors may be tempted to succumb to opportunistic 
behavior and deviate from collaborative agreements, regulative cooperative arrangements will be 
required that provide institutional safeguards through monitoring and enforcement.   
Due to geographic limitations, local governments will generally cooperate with other 
governments within their immediate proximities while occasionally working with governments 
from different regional areas (Post, 2004).  However, long distance cooperation may reduce the 
cost-to-benefit ratio often associated with contracting (Post, 2004) as such relationships may 
entail substantial investments in high fixed costs.  Geographic limitations dictate the number of 
available partners that a metropolitan area will have to forge agreements.  If an area has a large 
number of partners, the chances are that there will be a larger number of opportunities for 
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intergovernmental cooperation (Post, 2004).  However, more jurisdictions lead to larger groups 
involved in ICA efforts, which may lead to less voluntary means of cooperation.    
 In order for group action to take place, homogeneity in goals, objectives and attributes must 
exist between participants.  Common policy objectives and characteristics may include such 
things as a common desire to realize cost savings, the mutual desire to service a community 
across jurisdictions, and the homogeneity of constituent preferences for specific goods and 
services (Post, 2004).  Other commonalities may include decisions to invest in large capital 
infrastructure, fiscal strengths and weaknesses, and policy spending directions.   Cooperative 
agreements between communities may be difficult to achieve if the preferences of one 
community are different from those of another.  For example, income inequalities may lead to 
difficulties in forging joint efforts as one government may be averse to the risk of taking on the 
fiscal burdens of another (Gerber and Gibson, 2005).  The lack of homogeneity in goals and 
policy objectives can bring forth differing bargaining positions which may require more 
regulative institutional arrangements to harness cooperative tradeoffs.  Without such 
mechanisms, collaborative efforts would be hindered by division problems.  Voluntary 
cooperation would be difficult to achieve as the parties involved would encounter problems in 
agreeing to the division of their mutual gains (Feiock, 2007).   
   From a selective benefits standpoint, complexities brought forth by coordination problems 
can have implications on general governments’ willingness to voluntarily cooperate.  These 
problems can complicate cooperative efforts when information regarding the details and 
outcomes of arrangements is not common to all participants (Feiock, 2007).  Barriers to 
voluntary cooperation often exist when actors have difficulties identifying opportunities for 
mutual gains.  Such problems will arise if parties misunderstand the risks and results of the 
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processes of cooperation (Maser, 1998).  When resources are limited and information is costly, 
rational actors will have difficulties organizing agreement efforts as the expected outcome for 
cooperation may be vague or unknown.  Participants will have problems initiating voluntary 
agreements with one another due to the presence of unknown variables that cloud expectations.  
  
Design of Descriptive Research and Findings  
The preceding sections highlighted the choices available to participants in cooperation, and 
the costs and benefits of doing so. The major proposition brought forth within this study entails 
that actors will use less voluntary methods of cooperation and lean more towards more regulated 
methods when the collective and selective benefits are threatened by high transaction costs.  This 
analysis operates off of the assumption that regional districts will take the place of voluntary 
cooperation, as the options of partial and full consolidation are rarely available and may not be 
feasible.   This proposition is examined by exploring the implications that transaction costs 
barriers had on the inception of specific special districts.  The purpose of this approach is to 
systematically connect the concepts drawn from this study to formulate ideas that explain the 
given phenomenon (Straus and Corbin, 1998).  While this descriptive analysis is not a grounded 
theory approach per se, it seeks to shed some light on the conditions that drive local governments 
to use more versus less regulated cooperative methods to address regional needs by using these 
specific cases as examples.  The observations that are made from these cases offer meaningful 
insight and guidance to this framework. 
The methods within this descriptive analysis consist of three major components; data, data 
coding, and procedures of data interpretation (Straus and Corbin, 1998).  In the summer of 2007, 
I interviewed the officials of 18 independent multi-jurisdictional special districts by phone to 
collect their insight on the roles that regional collective action played in their creation.  Of the 18 
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districts surveyed, were five fire districts, six library districts, and seven hospital districts 
selected randomly from a larger population.  The respondents within each district were either the 
district’s head administrative officer or someone of equal administrative capacity.  As regional 
effects may have implications on governmental choices in institutional arrangements the locale 
of the examined districts spread across various regions of the country1.   
All interviews were semi-structured, and entailed a battery of 10 questions that asked 
about the specifics of the implications of collective actions on the creation of these special 
districts.  Following the technique of prior qualitative work (Argonoff, 2003; Brower and 
Abolafia, 1996; Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Schensul, et al., 1999; Straus and Corbin, 1998), this 
research uses an open coding system to codify data based upon information gathered from the 
surveys (Straus and Corbin, 1998).  As data emerged, various concepts were created that 
systematically established relationships between different characteristics, actions, and themes 
brought forth throughout the analysis.  This data coding system allowed the data to be bridged 
within this framework, while providing this research with an analytical method of assessing the 
information drawn from the administered surveys (Straus and Corbin, 1998).   
The data were then interpreted and conceptually ordered according to their property and 
dimensions and described based upon specific categories (Straus and Corbin, 1998).  This step 
led to the process of developing ideas which were conceived based upon data interpretation, and 
then formulating them into explanatory schemes.  Finally, specific aspects of these explanatory 
schemes were developed into contextual propositions that are set to develop a theoretical 
framework, and guide future analyses in the development of empirical investigations.   
 
                                                 
1 Please note that this is not a strong method of controlling for regional effects.  This was more so a method of 
obtaining general representation for descriptive purposes. 
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Analytical Findings and Discussion 
  Table 1 summarizes the results of the conducted inquiry.  Regional districts were found to 
be used as mechanisms of cooperation.  However, the extent to why officials chose districts for 
service provision as opposed to more voluntary methods of cooperation varied among the given 
service types.  When questioned, officials revealed that fire and hospital districts were more so 
driven by cost than library districts.  Fire and hospital districts were seen primarily as tools of 
financing large capital infrastructure and supplying highly asset specific equipment.  
Specifically, fire district officials reported that their districts were most useful in areas where 
local governments had problems generating tax revenue and sustaining adequate fire services.  
The abilities of these districts to generate revenue make them valuable assets in efforts to 
cooperatively provide regional services.  Hospital officials revealed that their districts were 
useful when it came to providing an additional source of debt financing.  In these cases hospital 
districts were found to be valuable because of their ability to borrow large sums of cash without 
impacting general government budgets.   
 The nature of fire and hospital services entails high fixed costs which were found to be best 
internalized by special districts.   The capital-intensive nature of these services creates scale 
economies that can make it particularly costly for individuals to engage in more voluntary 
methods of regional cooperation (Mullin, 2009).  The data brought forth from these specific 
findings indicate that where the individual costs were high, and where collective benefits were 
stood to be gained; fire and hospital districts were more apt to be used. 
 Library districts on the other hand, were found to be used primarily as mechanisms to 
provide a service that was deemed as having high popularity.  Officials reported that citizens’ 
desire to promote reading and gain access to free information were the major issues that sparked 
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the creation of these districts.  Additionally, it was reported that citizens were concerned with 
enhancing their communities’ educational and cultural needs.  Library districts in this instance 
were found to be established in areas where residents had little or no access to such services.  In 
essence, regional libraries were used as a means of extending the accessibility of services to 
citizens.  For these respondents, regional library districts were developed as a direct result of 
communities desiring to acquire services.  These responses lend support to Burns’ (1994) 
findings that local government formation is often the result of citizens’ desires to enhance service 
provision.  Given the current analysis, library districts were found to be used more so in the 
instance of obtaining the selective benefits of addressing service demands.         
Regarding group dynamics, the hospital and fire districts in question were found to exist in 
areas where jurisdictions were fewer and more disbursed.  As suggested in the table, these 
districts were more so used in the midst of high individual costs that stood to bring large 
collective gains.  Conversely, library districts were found to exist in areas where jurisdictions 
were more geographically concentrated, and more participants were willing to participate in 
cooperative efforts.  The current findings suggest that these specific library districts were more 
so used as mechanisms to overcome higher collective costs or barriers to group formation.  From 
a homogeneity standpoint, common policy objectives were found to exist among jurisdictions 
within all three district types.  However, approaches to achieving those common objectives 
tended to differ.  In this light, districts were seen as bridges of communication that helped 
officials overcome disagreements in approaches to achieving given policy goals.   
 
Table 1 about here 
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The Roles of Service Demands and Group Dynamics   
The first proposition entails combining the perspectives of regional service demands and 
group dynamics.   From this perspective, it was evident that the creation and usage of the 
surveyed library districts were motivated by the selective benefits of cooperation (Feiock, 2007).  
The selective benefits of cooperation entail the benefits directly gained by local leaders from 
successful collaborative service innovations (Feiock, 2007). As highlighted above, the usage of 
regional library districts were found to be driven by motivations to fulfill citizens’ service 
preferences.  Additionally, these districts were seen as addressing service preferences where 
preferences were more abundant and diverse.  This was reflected in the number of available 
cooperating jurisdictions.  Fire and hospital districts were found to exist in areas where groups 
were deemed as being smaller and more disbursed, whereas library districts were found to be in 
areas where groups tended to be larger.  Likewise, fire and hospital districts were reported to 
exist in areas that were more rural and less geographically concentrated, whereas library districts 
were found to be in more urbanized areas where jurisdictions were larger and more condense.   
Considering service demands, library and hospital districts were found to be useful when 
populations tended to increase.  However, library district usage within this analysis was deemed 
as being driven more so by the perception of service value.  This particular finding gives some 
support to the selective benefits argument in that the incentives of local leaders to address the 
preferences of constituents have implications for their willingness to enter into cooperative 
arrangements (Feiock, 2007).  However, voluntary cooperative arrangements were difficult to 
achieve in these cases due to the higher transaction costs brought forth by their group dynamics.  
Transaction costs in this scenario were deemed higher because these library districts often 
operated within areas that were more geographically concentrated, entailing larger groups with 
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more diverse preferences.  Given these group dynamics, regional districts were deemed as being 
the safer arrangement, as participants may have been left vulnerable to potential collective action 
problems associated with high information and coordination costs (Feiock, 2007; Inman & 
Rubinfeld, 1997).   From this perspective, coordination problems can arise as more governments 
bring forth more competition over limited resources.  More governments in these cases hindered 
coordination as the benefits of mutual gains became limited as groups became larger.   Here, 
benefits and costs may not have been distributed equally as some jurisdictions may have incurred 
more costs, while others gained more benefit.  Additionally, the economies of scale would be 
severely reduced, as larger groups by nature may produce proportionally smaller benefits to its 
members.  Larger groups can also bring forth problems of delivering and obtaining perfect 
information as higher potential exists for communication to become blocked or distorted between 
members.   “Even where local officials have complete information, achieving agreement on 
formulas or procedures to allocate costs or benefits can be difficult” (Feiock, 2007:51) because 
larger groups may involve some members having a disproportionate share of decision making 
powers as opposed to others.    
Proposition 1: When the selective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of regional 
districts is positively related to the extent that the organizing of services entails information and 
coordination complexities. 
 
The Cost of Regional Needs 
 The second implication brought forth from the surveys is that a regional need must exist 
in order for multi-jurisdictional special districts to come forth.  However, the more latent lesson 
learned within this analysis is that the extent of these needs are determined by the nature of the 
service sector.  Fire and hospital districts were shown to be driven by motivations to capture the 
scales of economies encompassed within collective benefits (Feiock, 2007).  The collective 
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benefits perspective sees cooperation being motivated by the benefits of obtaining efficiency 
gains.  Here, we can begin to conceptualize special districts as tools of harnessing financial 
resources to address regional needs.  This may be especially true when regional needs require 
substantial long-term financial investments.  As suggested within the beginning of this essay, 
high financial costs brought forth by service endeavors can bring forth barriers to voluntary ICA.   
 From another more economical standpoint, the responses within these interviews suggested 
that regional districts can be beneficial in the provision and delivery of services that require 
significantly high fixed costs.  Unlike general purpose governments, special districts have the 
ability to maintain autonomous control over revenue generation, which allows them to have 
access to government sources of revenue with less scrutiny (Farmer, 2008).  They have the 
luxury of being private organizations that enjoy the benefits of governmental resources.  From 
this perspective, they have the ability to undertake more investment risks that require 
substantially higher start-up costs in order to obtain the long-term benefits of economies-of-
scale.  High fixed costs within cooperative efforts may also require costly methods of contract 
monitoring and enforcement to assure that all actors are in compliance with the agreement, 
which would make voluntary methods of cooperation difficult to achieve (Farmer, 2008).  
Further, higher fixed costs within cooperative efforts can naturally act as a fertile ground for 
problems of adversarial legalism (Anderson and Kagan, 2000).  Therefore, special districts may 
be more apt to be employed to provide services with higher fixed costs, as opposed to voluntary 
methods of regional cooperation.   
Proposition 2a: When the collective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of regional 
districts is positively related to the extent that services require substantial long-term financial 
investments. 
   
Proposition 2b: When the collective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of regional 
districts is positively related to the extent that services require high fixed costs. 
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Communities Advancing Collective Policy Objectives  
 The third implication within this study suggests that homogeneity plays an important role 
in decisions to use regional districts.  Regarding community attributes, implications of 
community commonalities could be brought forth from physical attributes such as the 
environment and geographic location.  From this perspective, certain industrial and 
environmental needs may have driven local governments to seek special district formation rather 
than voluntarily cooperate.  Though officials did not report to this implication directly, an 
examination of the geographic location and industrial and socio-economic makeup gave hints to 
the behaviors of the local governments within these areas.  In this light, spatial proximity was 
suggested to play an important role in regional district usage.  Specifically, it gave hints to the 
importance of similarities between communities.  When we consider the dynamics of the given 
service sectors, the sectors that entailed higher financial costs tended to have districts within less 
geographically concentrated areas.  This assertion brings forth two implications.  First, services 
with higher costs that require cooperation between indirect neighbors will be likely candidates 
for regional district usage.  Higher scales of economies in the face of high financial and fixed 
costs may be achieved through special districts for regional needs that incorporate non-
conterminous jurisdictions.  Second, this supports an argument ingrained within explanations of 
community characteristics (Feiock, 2007), and suggests that the cooperation for services that 
span beyond the borders of direct neighbors may be more difficult to achieve through voluntary 
ICA efforts.   
 This particular finding supports arguments of interlocal cooperative transaction costs and 
presents that regional districts are useful when bargaining positions differ between local officials.  
Though the findings revealed that the government institutions in question had similar policy 
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objectives regarding all district types, they had dissimilarities in their approaches to achieving 
said objectives.  This situation brings forth potential problems with bargaining and compliance, 
as defection may occur if one or all of the parties do not comply with the agreement in the first 
place (Feiock, 2007).  Local governments that have different approaches to policy outcomes may 
have difficulties converging preferences, which may bring forth incentives for some parties to 
renege.  While one local government’s approach to economic development may entail investing 
solely in tax exemptions for business recruitment, another government’s preference may be to 
invest in land site development assistance for distressed areas. Though, the given policy 
objective appears to be the same, the specific interests regarding its outcome tend to drift apart. 
“The higher the probability that their interest will drift apart, the less likely a contract can be 
struck” (Feiock, 2007:52).   
Within the current analysis, regional districts were brought forth as tools of information 
bridging to overcome differences in approaches to achieving policy objectives.  In this light, 
regional districts can be looked upon as network structures for mitigating collective action 
problems (Scholz, Feiock, and Ahn 2006).  Regional districts can act as a link that bridges 
connections between government structures to enhance information flows.  The nature of this 
relationship allows clustered networks to be more carefully monitored as third-party 
governments increase the flow of information and reduce information/coordination costs 
(Feiock, 2007).  As approaches to policy objectives tended to diverge, the cost of enforcement 
within these cases tended to rise. Due to the lack of consensus on how to achieve policy 
objectives, threats of reneging severely hindered the credibility of voluntary collaboration.  This 
brought forth the need to use regional districts to reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
the compliance of interlocal agreements.   
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Proposition 3a: When the collective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of regional 
districts is positively related to the extent that service provision spans across indirect 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
 
Proposition 3b: When the selective/collective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of 
regional districts is positively related to the extent that the organizing of services entails 
negotiation and division complexities.  
 
Proposition 3c: When the selective/collective benefits of cooperation are present, the usage of 
regional districts is positively related to the extent that the organizing of services entails 
enforcement and monitoring complexities. 
 
Further Institutional Considerations  
 The presented argument regarding regional district usage in the face of collective action 
involves a rational choice perspective that focuses on the selective and collective benefits of 
interlocal cooperation.  The three specific service sectors observed within this study gave hints as 
to how variations in cooperative benefits can play an important role in decisions to use voluntary 
or non-voluntary methods of cooperation.  Though the descriptive analysis brought forth 
important assumptions that were worked into propositions, it is important to remember that the 
discussed factors are contextual at best, and therefore require at least the mentioning of other 
institutional considerations.         
   One such important consideration to be mentioned is the existence of institutionally 
coercive measures that may hinder cooperation.  State mandates have often encouraged or 
discouraged cooperation among local governments through regulation (Post, 2004).   State laws 
influence the number of governments that are available for cooperation by regulating local 
government formation and the expansion/contraction of existing local government boundaries 
(Burns, 1994; Post, 2004).  The assumption that lies here is that state regulations on boundary 
changes may have implications on the abilities and willingness of local governments to 
cooperate.  Likewise, state laws also influence the cost of intergovernmental collective action 
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through the regulation of intergovernmental agreements (Post, 2004).  When states impose heavy 
regulations on localities regarding interlocal cooperation, the use of voluntary ICA’s efforts will 
be difficult to achieve.  The institutional constraints imposed by states will have a heavy hand in 
decisions of jurisdictions to cooperate through regional special districts. 
The institutional authority of local governments dictates the powers, which give 
jurisdictions the ability to function.  Non-chartered governments will function differently than 
chartered governments.  Local governments with charters (or home rule) will generally have a 
higher degree of service authority and will generally have the abilities to provide a broader 
variety of services (Benton 2002).  This distinction is important when examining local 
government service arrangements because the degree of service provision authority within local 
governments will dictate their willingness to cooperate.  Basically, since a charter government 
has the ability to expand its service provision and production, it would have a lesser need to 
collaborate with other jurisdictions for service provision.  Therefore, more authority and stronger 
service abilities within governments may act as a barrier to ICA efforts of any sort. 
Finally, it is important to consider the nature of the given service sector when considering 
regional district usage in light of ICA efforts.  Special districts are unique in that fire districts 
differ from hospital districts, and hospital districts will differ from water utility districts.  
Therefore, it is not safe to assume that because one service is provided through a special district, 
others will be as well.  As different district types incorporate different production efficiencies, 
some districts will more likely be used in cooperative efforts than others.  By nature, some 
service sectors will enable actors to realize more economies of scales, therefore promoting the 
likelihood that voluntary efforts will be realized.   
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It is also important to consider the nature of the transaction costs encompassed within given 
services.  Some services are less tangible than others, and will therefore require more efforts in 
specifying levels of output (Brown and Potoski, 2003).  By nature, these services may be more 
difficult to realize through voluntary ICA efforts simply because difficulties in output 
measurability raise the transaction costs of compliance monitoring and enforcement.  The same 
logic may apply to services with high asset specificity.  Here, services that require highly 
specific pieces of equipment, human skills, locations, or time periods may be less likely to be 
administered through voluntary arrangements of cooperation, as the nature of these services can 
potentially bring forth opportunistic behavior among actors.  Accordingly, high asset specificity 
entails high transactions costs that will require formal institutional arrangements to ensure 
fairness among bargaining positions, as well as ensure that agreement compliance is maintained 
(Williamson, 1985; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Feiock, 2007).              
Proposition 4a: The usage of regional districts is positively related to state level constraints on 
local government boundary change.    
 
Proposition 4b: The usage of regional districts is positively related to state level constraints on 
interlocal agreements. 
 
Proposition 4c: The usage of regional districts is negatively related to the existence of home rule 
authority within local governments. 
 
Proposition 4d: The usage of regional districts is positively related to the extent that services 
have complex output/outcome measurements.  
 
Proposition 4e: The usage of regional districts is positively related to the extent that services 
require asset specific resources. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was not to bring forth concrete inference, but rather instigate a 
line of questioning about choices in efforts to implement ICA.  The propositions brought forth in 
this analysis sought to explore the implications of transaction cost barriers to voluntary 
cooperative efforts on more regulated methods of collaboration.  Though, the current study 
placed an emphasis on regional districts, the intent behind this piece was to suggest a unique way 
to begin exploring the spectrum of cooperative service choices in ICA efforts.  The idea was to 
conceptualize why institutions would rely on alternative methods of regional cooperation when 
barriers to voluntary cooperative institutions exist.  The special districts examined within this 
analysis were used more so as real world examples to illustrate how the implications of 
transaction costs to ICA efforts affect regional choices within the context of specific benefits to 
institutions and actors.     
Using these contextual propositions, empirical investigations could be conducted that 
explore the notions brought forth within this framework.  Here, researchers can explore the 
implications of the collective and selective benefits on regional collective action, and address 
important questions regarding rational choices in institutional arrangements.  At this point, we 
can develop formal empirical models that test the assumptions of these propositions and bring 
forth concrete evidence about the effects of transaction cost barriers on such choices.  A more 
specific question could entail more empirical work that explores the strengths and weaknesses of 
policy networks versus regional districts.  This question could also be expanded to entail a 
broader array of service sectors that capture a fuller picture of production and provision 
attributes.  To date, many of the studies that explore ICA make general assumptions that assume 
that the same rules of cooperation and transaction costs are applicable across service sectors.  
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What the current analysis has shown us is that services are contextual and should be treated as 
such.  By nature some services will require the consideration of higher transaction costs, while 
others have more political implications.  Some services are more suitable for policy networks, 
while others may require the installation of stricter institutional safeguards.  Yet, other services 
may be statutorily mandated to be implemented regionally by institutions that afford less 
autonomy to participants.  These and several other factors should be considered when exploring 
institutional service collaboration choices.   As the exploration of institutional choices in ICA 
efforts brings forth a growing body of literature, students of this area can explore and postulate 
new hypotheses that will continue to shed light on these phenomena.          
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Figure 1.  Array of Regional Governance Institutions 
 
 
 
High                Low 
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     policy         agreements      governmental agreements         governments         districts     districts     general  
      networks         contracts                                                                                                             government 
 
 
 
Source: Scholz and Feiock (2007). 
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Table 1.  The Cost and Benefits Associated with Specific Regional Districts 
   Fire Districts  Library Districts  Hospital Districts 
Collective Benefits  Large economies of scale; 
Reduction of taxation 
burden to jurisdictions; 
Internalization of fixed 
costs 
  Large economies of 
scale; Mechanism of 
debt financing; 
Internalization of fixed 
costs 
         
Selective Benefits    Provision of an important 
service to citizens; 
Government officials 
meet service demands; 
Access to otherwise 
missing services 
  
         
Collective Costs  Division in tactics to 
achieve policy objectives 
Complexities to group 
dynamics; Division in 
tactics to achieve policy 
objectives 
Division in tactics to 
achieve policy objectives 
         
Selective Costs  High fixed costs; Capital 
intensive infrastructure; 
Asset specific equipment 
   High fixed costs; Capital 
intensive infrastructure; 
Asset specific equipment 
 
 
 
